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The Scale of Networks?:
Local Climate Change Coalitions
Hari M. Osofsky*
Janet Koven Levit**
I. INTRODUCTION: LOCAL CLIMATE COALITIONS
Spring 2007 was a heady time for climate advocates. The fourth report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change expressed an overwhelming
scientific consensus that anthropogenic climate change is a serious problem
The US Supreme Court not only addressed climate change for the first time, but
also found that the US Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had abused
2
its discretion in denying a petition asking it to regulate motor vehicle emissions .
The UN Security Council also took an initial look at climate change, with a
ranging debate over its security implications.
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See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007: Summary for Poliymakers,in S. Solomon, et
al, eds, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (Cambridge 2007), available online at
(visited Nov 17,
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf>
2007).
See Massachusetts v EPA, 127 S Ct 1438 (2007).
See UN Security Council, Secunily Council Holds FirstEver Debate on Impact of Climate Change, (Apr 17,
2007), available online at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9OOO.doc.htm>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Amid that furor, it is perhaps unsurprising that another important moment
in climate regulation slipped by without nearly so much public attention. On
May 15, 2007, Tulsa, Oklahoma became the 500th city to join the US Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement. 4 This coalition of mayors around the country
began in 2005 under the leadership of Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels on the day
that the Kyoto Protocol came into force without the United States as a party.5
The effort has grown so substantially over the last two years that the US
Conference of Mayors launched a climate protection center in February 2007.6
Tulsa's decision to join was notable not only because of the coalition hitting the
500 mark, but also because of its location at the center of the US energy
industry.
Urban leadership on climate change in the United States, however, began
well before the federal government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. Many
US cities and counties have played a crucial role in international coalitions of
localities attempting to make progress on emissions. Portland, Oregon, for
example, has long been at the forefront of these issues, including being the first
US city to develop a carbon reduction plan back in 1993.' Portland's 2001 Local
Action Plan on Global Warming aimed to reduce its carbon emissions to 10
percent below its 1990 levels by 2010.
Moreover, localities serve in many ways as the front line for difficult
decisionmaking on emissions and their impacts. Local land use and
transportation choices shape residents' emissions decisions. A US EPA
inventory of 2005 emissions found that 33 percent of emissions came from
transportation activities and that over 60 percent of those emissions stemmed

4

Kevin McCarty, Bloombetg Palmer Lead USA and World Mayors on Climate Protection: US Mayors
ClimateAgreement Hits 500 Milestone, US Mayor Newspaper, (May 21, 2007), available online at
<http://www.usmayors.org/USCM/usmayor-newspaper/documents/05_21_07/pglNYC_
climate.asp> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

5

US Conference of Mayors, U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protecion Agreement, available online at
<http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
US Conference of Mayors, About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, available online at
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<http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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See Joan Laatz, Ci Council HearsPlan to Cut Air Pollution, Oregonian C6 (Mar 4, 1993); ICLEILocal
Governments
for
Sustainability,
CCP Partidpants, available
online
at
<http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=809> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Timothy Grewe, Susan
Anderson, and Laurel Butman, Portland, Oregon: A Case Study in Sustainabilio, 18 Govt Fin Rev 8
(Feb 2002).
See City of Portland and Multnomah County, LocalAction Plan on Global Warming, 1 (April 2001),
available online at <http://www.portlandonine.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=25050> (visited
Nov 17, 2007); Local Action Plan on Global Warming: Binding City Policy BCP-ENN-5.01,
Portland
City
Council
Res
35995
(Apr
25,
2001),
available
online
at
<http://www.portlandonline.com/Auditor/index.cfm?a=cfaej&c=cjbfb> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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from personal vehicle use.' Even the most progressive cities struggle with
reconciling emissions reduction and urban growth. For example, after over a
decade of concentrated effort on reducing greenhouse gas emissions that has
resulted in a 12.5 percent decline in per capita emissions, Portland's emissions
were still above 1990 levels. 10
A growing scholarly and public policy dialogue examines these tensions
and the role of localities in climate change regulation. To date, however, analyses
of cities' participation in climate policy have largely focused on some
combination of law and policy initiatives, urban theory, and the intersection of
international law with political science." At the same time, interdisciplinary

10

See US Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2005,
Executive
Summary,
ES-7
(Apr
2007),
available
online
at
<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads06/07ES.pdf>
(visited Nov 17,
2007).
See Maria Rojo de Steffi, et al, A Progress Report on the Ciy of Portland and Multnomah Count Local
Action Plan on Global Warming, 1 (une 2005), available online at <www.portlandonine.com/
shared/cfm/image.cfm?id= 112118> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See, for example, Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils ofthe Piecemeal
Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 Cornell J L & Pub Poly 369 (2006);
Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems
and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United
States, 5 Dickinson J Envir L & Poly 175 (1996); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change
Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This
Say About Federalism and EnvironmentalLaw?, 38 Urban Law 1015 (2006); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr,
Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 Penn St Envir L Rev 15 (2004); Judith
Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of
Entrj, 115 Yale L J 1564, 1627-33 (2006); Katherine Trisolini and Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land
Use, and the Global Commons: Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in William C.G. Burns
and Hari M. Osofsky, eds, Adjudicating Climate Change: Sub-National, National, and Supra-National
Approaches - (Cambridge forthcoming 2008); Carolyn Kousky and Stephen H. Schneider, Global
Climate Poligy: Will Cities Lead the Way?, 3 Climate Poly 359 (2003); Laura Kosloff and Mark
Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 Nat Resources & Envir 46
(2004).
But see Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of
International Law, 32 Yale J Intl L 393, 402-04 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Letigation as
Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26 Stanford Envir L J 181 & 43 Stanford J Intl L 181 (2007) (joint issue);
Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibiliy: Mapping the Rok of
SubNational Climate Change Litigation, 20 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 143 (2007).
For a general discussion, see Neil Brenner, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of
Statehood (Oxford 2004); Mark R. Montgomery, et al, eds, Cities Transformed: Demographic Change and
Its Implications in the Developing World (National Academies 2003); Peter Marcuse and Ronald van
Kempen, eds, Globalijng Cities: A New Spatial Order? (Blackwell 2000); Saskia Sassen, ed, Global
Networks: Linked Cities (Routledge 2002); Heidi H. Hobbs, City Hall Goes Abroad The Foreign Poliy
of Local Politics (Sage 1994); Saskia Sassen, The Global Ciy: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton 2d
ed 2001); H.V. Savitch and Paul Kantor, Cities in the International Markeplace: The Political Economy of
Urban Development in North America and Western Europe (Princeton 2002); Kevin R. Cox, ed, Spaces of
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scholarly literature has explored the significance of networks for international
law. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter's transgovernmentalism brings a law
and political science lens to networks among international actors.12 And Annelise
Riles has considered transnational networks from a law and anthropology
perspective.13 This work has not, however, drawn substantially from the growing
discourse in geography over the significance of networks. 4
This Article aims to build upon both of these streams by considering the
ways in which bottom-up lawmaking and geography might enhance the narrative
of urban choices regarding climate change. In particular, it integrates Janet
Levit's exploration of bottom-up lawmaking with Hari Osofsky's work on law
and geography"5 to examine the role of localities in transnational environmental

12

Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local (Guilford 1997); Richard Sennet, The Conscience of the
Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities (Knopf 1990); Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds, World
Cities in a World-System (Cambridge 1995). More recently, Frug and Barron have built upon the
existing models in an article considering cities' dual roles "as simultaneously subordinate domestic
governments and independent international actors." Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron,
InternationalLocal Government Law, 38 Urban Law 1, 2 (2006). See also Keith Aoki, Kristy Young,
and Thomas Hwei, (n)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models, Immigration, Non-Citizen Votin,
and Language Regulation (draft manuscript on file with Hari M. Osofsky) (building upon Frug's and
Barron's work in the context of cities and noncitizens). For some of the scholarship on state-level
climate initiatives, see Barry G. Rabe, Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American
Climate Change Poli7 (Brookings Institution 2004); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 UC Davis L Rev 281 (2003); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to
Global Warming: Is It Constitutionalto Think Globally and Act Localy?, 21 Pace Envir L Rev 53 (2003);
Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Pokiy: American State and Canadian
ProvincialPoligy Development, 14 Widener L J 121 (2004); Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political
Voice in Climate Change Poliy: The Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in Burns and
Osofsky, eds, Adjudicating Climate Change - (cited in note 11).
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 65-103 (Princeton 2004). For interesting
explorations of dynamics among complex and shifting regimes in the intellectual property
context, see Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shiing: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J Ind L 1 (2004); Kal Raustiala and David G.
Victor, The Regime Complexfor Plant Genetic Resources, 58 Intl Org 277 (2004).

13

See Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (Michigan 2000).

14

For examples of the scholarly literature on geographic network theory and scale, see Kevin R.
Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics, 17
Pol Geog 1 (1998). For commentary on and debate over Cox's approach, see Katherine T. Jones,
Scale as Epistemology, 17 Pol Geog 25 (1998); Dennis R. Judd, The Case of the Missing Scales: A
Commenta7y on Cox, 17 Pol Geog 29 (1998); Michael Peter Smith, Looking for the Global Spaces in
Local Politics, 17 Pol Geog 35 (1998); Kevin R. Cox, Representation and Power in the Politics of Scale, 17
Pol Geog 41 (1998); Lynn A. Staeheli, GlobaliZation and the Scales of Citizenship, 19 Geog Rsrch F 60
(1999).
A law and geography approach considers the ways in which spaces shape law and law shapes

15

spaces. See Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography, in Jane Holder and
Carolyn Harrison, eds, Law and Geography 3, 3-5 (Oxford 2003)
Our legal lives are constituted by shifting intersections of different and not
necessarily coherently articulating legal orders associated with different scalar
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networks. Using the examples of Tulsa and Portland, the piece considers the
scale of US cities' involvement in the problem of climate change and its
implications for climate policy.
The Article begins by examining two case studies of cities with very
different geographic positionality, Tulsa and Portland, as examples of the
relationship between networks and scale in the climate discourse. Although both
cities are actively engaged in coalitions of localities attempting to make progress
on climate change, the environment in which they operate is quite different.
Tulsa's local politicians have relationships with the state's substantial energy
industry-which includes major greenhouse gas emitters-while Portland long
has had the political base to lead the nation in progressive action on climate
change. The similarities and differences in the two cities' responses reflect their
engagement in public, private, and nonprofit networks at multiple scales, which
raises critical questions about how to view the scale at which these cities operate.
Building from this descriptive core, the Article then considers two potential
narratives of the urban activity on climate change. The first draws from Janet
Levit's work to provide a bottom-up lawmaking story of these two case
examples. In their day-to-day microdecisions, cities engage with other private
and nonprofit actors in an organic lawmaking process whereby practices become
norms and norms embed in law. In the instant examples, Portland and Tulsa
each independently embarked on a series of climate protective decisions, the
former for environmentally altruistic reasons and the latter largely in response to
budgetary pressures." While individual municipal decisions-such as powering
the mass transit system with natural gas rather than gasoline-have limited
normative weight, such decisions collectively become enmeshed in formal law.

spaces. The relations between these different legal spaces is a dynamic and
complex one, but it is a pressing and important subject of inquiry given the
ways in which codes operative at various scales intermingle.

16

David Delaney, Richard T. Ford, and Nicholas Blomley, Preface: Where is Law?, in Nicholas
Blomley, David Delaney, and Richard T. Ford, eds, The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and
Space xxi (Blackwell 2001). For examples of law and geography work, some of which explicitly
draws from the discipline of geography, see Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: CriticalGeography, the 'Third
World" in InternationalLaw and Citical Race Theory, 45 Vill
L Rev 913 (2000); Matthew R. Auer,
Geography, Domestic Politics and Environmental Diplomay: A Case from the Baltic Sea Region, 11
Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 77 (1998); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdicion,151 U
Pa L Rev 311 (2002); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History ofJurisdiction), 97 Mich L Rev 843
(1999); Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: Towards a PostcolonialMapping, 5 Santa
Clara J Ind L 525 (2007); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 Fordham L Rev 2501 (2005);
J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, The Geography of Wetlands Mitigation Banking (draft manuscript on file
with author); Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local Geography in American and
European EnvironmentalLaw, 73 Tulane L Rev 739 (1999). See also notes 101 and 119.
See Section II.
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Thus, cities-in this case Portland and Tulsa-are not mere implementers of law
from "above" but rather active lawmakers from "below."
The second narrative draws from Hari Osofsky's work on law and
geography and, more specifically, in the context of these cases, examines Kevin
Cox's claim that networks provide a helpful metaphor for understanding the
spatiality of scale. Cox argues that:
[T]he world is far more complicated than an easy equation of state-defined
territorial scales to variably scaled spaces of dependence would allow. Local
governments may form part of networks that bring together not just local
discretion between
interests but agents which have a degree of locational
7
one local government jurisdiction and another.'
Cities are not only formulating their own policies on greenhouse gas emissions.
They also participate in national and international networks of cities engaging
the problem of climate change and interact on a day-to-day basis with the
multinational corporations which they host. This simultaneous interface of the
local, national, and global raises questions of cities' scale in a globalizing world.
These cities' actions and relationships help to create what Cox terms "spaces of
engagement" that allow for a continuous rescaling of the climate debate. 18
The Article then brings together the bottom-up lawmaking and network
stories. It argues for what we term a "bottom-up networking" approach and
considers its implications for transnational legal responses to climate change. In
such an approach, rescaling is at the core of a myriad of bottom-up lawmaking
processes that confound state-centered conceptions of international law and
efforts at effective treatymaking on climate change. The Article further contends
that this thicker view of these cities' positionality with respect to scale could help
to frame more effective local strategies on climate change. Without an
understanding of cities as more than just "local" actors, approaches to climate
regulation will miss important aspects of their current and potential impact on
greenhouse gas emissions.
From this preliminary exposition of bottom-up networking, the Article
concludes by considering the research questions that such an approach would
open. It presents further descriptive and conceptual issues that we plan to
explore in future pieces.

II. FROM THE COAST TO THE HEARTLAND
Portland and Tulsa provide useful points of entry for analyzing US cities'
involvement in climate change because of how they fit into the country's
geopolitics. They are not simply physically disparate locations on a map, but
17

Cox, Spaces of Dependence, 17 Pol Geog at 20-21 (cited in note 14).

18

Id at 2.
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rather represent different political and cultural configurations. The coasts, both
East and West, have been leaders on emissions reductions and are most at risk
from initial climate impacts. The interior, in contrast, contains much of the
country's carbon wealth, with an economy deeply intertwined with energy
production.' 9
As such, the work of these two cities represents the complexities of urban
engagement of climate change. Portland demonstrates the outer edge of US
cities' efforts with its resultant successes, but also the limits of what even
sustained effort backed by political will can achieve in a growing municipality.
Tulsa, in contrast, provides lessons in what relatively conservative, heartland
cities can achieve on these issues and the complex navigation among actors that
can result in progressive change. Moreover, both case studies reflect the intricate
web of public, private, and nonprofit actors that constitute policy choices on
climate change. This Section details these two stories in order to open broader
questions about the appropriate role of cities in addressing climate change.
A. LEADING THE CHARGE FROM PORTLAND
As the US city with the longest effort at implementing sustainable carbon
choices, Portland is an excellent laboratory for the complexities of urban
emissions reduction. Portland's national leadership on issues of energy and
climate began in 1979, when it became the first US city to adopt an energy
policy."a This municipal policy was developed in the context of Oregon's state
land use laws of the 1970s, which established a comprehensive scheme that
included urban growth boundaries and long-range planning and encouraged
citizen involvement at multiple scales. 2' By the time Portland again led the
charge in adopting a carbon dioxide emissions reduction plan in 1993, more than
150 cities had used its energy policy as a model.2 2

19

20
21

22

As Hari Osofsky has analyzed, this contrasting positionality is apparent in the briefs in
Massachusetts v EPA, in which petitioner states were mostly coastal and respondent states were
primarily interior. Petitioner states focused on specific harms that they faced from climate change,
while respondents "scaled up" to focus on climate change as a global problem occurring over
extensive timescales. Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 9 Oregon Rev Intl L - (forthcoming 2007).
Rick Bella, Ciy Adopts Plan to Cut Emissions,Oregonian E2 (Nov 11, 1993).
See Grewe, Anderson, and Butman, 18 Govt Fin Rev at 9 (cited in note 7). For more in-depth
analyses of Oregon's land use controversies, see William G. Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict: The
Oregon Stoy, 1940-2000 (Washington 2004); W. Scott Prudham, Knock on Wood: Nature as a
Commodity in Douglas-Fir Country (Roudedge 2005). For a broader discussion of land use in the
West, see William R. Travis, New Geographiesof the American West: Land Use and the Changing Patterns
of Place (Island 2007).
Bella, C_y Adopts Plan, Oregonian at E2 (cited in note 20).
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Portland's goals and the substance of its plans have been ambitious and
have provided an important template for cities that have begun more recently to
pursue aggressive energy reduction strategies. As Timothy Grewe, Susan
Anderson, and Lauren Butman-all involved in leading the administration of
Portland's efforts-have noted, "[w]hat makes Portland unique is its
institutionalization of sustainability as a core business driver."23 At least as
significantly, its struggles provide an important lesson about localities and
climate change. Despite impressive per capita reductions, Portland's growth has
made its total emissions goals more elusive. It thus serves as an example of the
difficulties of balancing growth with emissions reduction.24 This Section explores
the mix of public leadership, private commitments, and nonprofit advocacy that
shape Portland's efforts.
1. Public Leadership
Portland first began grappling with how to frame its climate change efforts
in the early 1990s under the leadership of then-Commissioners Earl Blumenauer
and Mike Lindberg. Together with their counterparts in eleven other cities
around the world, Portland officials explored questions of how real climate
change was and what cities could do to address it. 25 Through that dialogue, they
created an informal network of cities committed to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels.26 According to Susan Anderson,
then-intern at and now-director of Portland's Office of Sustainable
Development, "Back then, we didn't talk about global warming because people
would've thought we were wacky .... We talked about making changes for the
cost-saving benefits. 27
In 1993, as a result of these dialogues, the Portland City Council
unanimously adopted a carbon dioxide reduction plan that specifically focused
on the gas's contribution to climate change. The plan covered a wide range of
urban policy areas, including land use planning, transportation, energy efficiency,
solid waste and recycling, urban forestry, and renewable energy.2a Portland's
carbon reduction strategy set the ambitious goal of reduction to 20 percent

23

Grewe, Anderson, and Burman, 18 Govt Fin Rev at 9 (cited in note 7).

24

Rojo de Steffi, et al, A ProgressReport at 1-2 (cited in note 10).

25

John Foyston, Warming World, CoolCity, Oregonian El (Apr 21, 2006).

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

City of Pordand Office of Sustainable Development, PortlandClimate Change Efforts (April 2003),
available online at <http://www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112117>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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below 1990 levels by 2010.29 It also became the first city in the United States to
join the international coalition of Cities for Climate Protection, which has grown
to include 691 cities around the world.3 °
Since making that commitment to aggressive greenhouse gas reduction,
Portland has accumulated an impressive list of successes that include: 2 new
major light rail lines and a 75 percent increase in public transit use since 1990;
purchase of more than 10 percent renewable energy for its energy use; a
recycling rate of 54 percent; construction of close to 40 high-performance green
buildings; planting of over 750,000 trees and shrubs since 1996; weatherization
of 10,000 multi-family units and over 800 family homes over a 2 -year period;
and establishing the Energy Trust of Oregon.3 1 It reduced per capita emissions
by 12.5 percent over that period, which puts it at the leading edge of urban
achievement on climate change in the United States.32
And yet, despite all of these efforts and progress, its greenhouse gas
emissions were still at slightly above 1990 levels in 2004, making a reduction to
even its scaled back April 2000 goal of 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010
quite difficult.3 3 The biggest problem facing Portland in reaching its total
emissions target is that more and more people inhabit it each year. Each new
person adds emissions. Per capita emissions must be well below 1990 levels for
total emissions to come down sufficiently.34 Perhaps such a problem is not so
serious. After all, by moving to Portland, those people may be reducing their
carbon footprint. But it does raise the complexities of balancing urban growth
with greenhouse gas reductions.
The critical question from a public policy perspective is how much further
Portland can go under its current model of green economic development. From
2001 to 2004, Portland made significant additional progress. It continued
monitoring emissions and supporting community education on climate change.35
Its per capita building energy use declined 7 percent due in large part to the
work of the Energy Trust of Oregon and the programs it has created for

29

Portland Energy Office, Carbon Dioxide Reduction Strategy: Success and Setbacks, 1 (une

30

available online at <http://www.pordandonine.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112113>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
Laatz, City Council Hears Plan, Oregonian at C6 (cited in note 7); ICLEI, CCP Partcipants(cited in

31

note 7).
Rojo de Steffi, et al, A Progress Report at 1 (cited in note 10).

32

Id.

33

Id at 1-2; Portland Energy Office, Carbon Dioxide Reduction Strategy at I (cited in note 29).

34

See Rojo de Steffi, et al, A ProgressReport at 1 (cited in note 10).

35

Id at 2.
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customers of major energy utilities.3 6 It debuted its central city street car and two
light rail lines during that period.3" By adding to its renewable energy resources,
particularly wind power, Portland achieved the above-mentioned goal of
purchasing 10 percent renewable energy and, in fact, reached just over 11
percent of its electricity from renewables in 2005.38 Its continued efforts on
recycling and tree planting also had an impact.39 The city has ambitious goals for
the future as well and will continue to be an important public policy laboratory
as it leads the way. 40
2. Private Commitments
Portland's public policy achievements on climate change have been
coupled with area companies' early recognition that progressive steps on climate
change could be good for their bottom line. For example, in 2001, Portlandbased The Collins Companies 4 became the first forest products company to
make a commitment to decrease its carbon emissions. 42 The Collins Companies
established a goal of bringing emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels within 8
years, which would prevent 150,000 tons of carbon dioxide.43 Because its plan
simultaneously aimed at saving millions of dollars, Collins modeled ways in
which climate consciousness could be tied to profitability for a state dependent
on the forestry industry.44
Collins was not the only Portland area business to take early action on
climate change. For example, Nike Inc., which is based in Beaverton, Oregon,
was one of the first five companies to join a Climate Savers agreement with the
World Wildlife Fund and Center for Energy & Climate Solutions. 41 Portland-

36

Id at 3-4.

37

Id at 4.

38

Id.

39

Id at 5.

40

Id at 5-6. Portland was recently ranked number one among US cities in terms of sustainability by
SustainLane. See Warren Karlenzig, et al, How Green Is Your Ci0?: The SustainLane U.S. City
Rankings 21-24 (New Society 2007).

41

Its website provides extensive description of its green business efforts. See The Collins
Companies, available online at <http://www.collmswood.com/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Brian J. Back, Timber Company Takes Industy Lead in Effort, Portland Bus J (Nov 16, 2001), available

42

online at <http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2001 /11/1 9/story7.html>
Nov 17, 2007).
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

(visited
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based Progressive Investment Management set aside money for The Climate
Trust in order to offset its emissions.4 6
Moreover, Portland is located in a state that has been among the leaders on
climate change. Oregon is currently wooing climate-friendly business as its ski
and wine industries worry about climate impacts.4 7 In March 2007, German
manufacturer SolarWorld AG announced that it would invest close to $400
million in a Hillsboro-based plant.48 Wind and biofuel companies are also
considering the state for their operations. 4 ' As Erin Anderson, Oregon
representative for the National Environmental Trust has noted, "Oregon is
positioning itself to be a leader in this new clean economy we're going to have to
develop."5 °
As with the public policy analysis, there remain ongoing questions about
how far public-private partnerships and corporate efforts on climate change can
and should go. For example, the above-mentioned Energy Trust works with
Portland General Electric, Pacific Power, and Northwest Natural-the energy
utilities that service Portland and the broader Multnomah County in which it is
located-on energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. After beginning
operations in 2002, the Energy Trust provided incentives to over 200 businesses
and 14,000 households in its first 2 years.5 ' In 2006, it also added natural gas
partnerships with Cascade Natural Gas Corporation and Avista Corporation. 2
However, as of 2006, Oregon still obtains over 40 percent of its electricity from
coal.53 Moreover, the state's ambitious work takes place against a backdrop of a
deregulated utility industry that in the mid-to-late 1990s, prior to the creation of
the Energy Trust, cut its energy conservation efforts by 60 to 70 percent.54 Fully
actualizing a green business model will still take significant forward movement.
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See Matthew Kish, Climate Change Legislation Could Boost Oregon Economy, Portland Bus J (Apr 6,
2007), available online at <http://pordand.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2007/04/02/
daily51.html?jst=s.cnil> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Rojo de Steffi, et al, A Progress Report at 3 (cited in note 10); Energy Trust of Oregon, nc, Whlo We
Are, available online at <http://www.energytrust.org/who/index.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See Energy Trust of Oregon, Who We Are (cited in note 51).
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See Michael Armstrong, City of Portland Office of Sustainable Development, Climate Protection in
Portland, 28 (Nov 2006), available online at <http://www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/
image.cfm?id= 140409> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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See Portland Energy Office, City of Portland-Carbon Dioxide Reduction Strategy Update, 5 (Nov 1997),
available online
at <http://www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id= 112112>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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3. Nonprofit Advocacy
Nonprofit advocacy also plays a crucial role in the Portland context. The
city's sustainable land use policies were deeply influenced, for example, by a
1988 study by the nonprofit group 1000 Friends of Oregon. That organization
prevented a new bypass highway system by providing the city with a study
comparing alternative ways to address population growth. In particular, "[t]he
study demonstrated how a land use pattern of moderate density and pedestrianfriendly neighborhoods along a regional transit network could reduce driving
and improve air quality."55 That land use choice by Portland arguably played a
key role in creating the urban structure that supports its innovative efforts on
climate change.
Portland is home to a wide range of nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs"), including environmental organizations that work on issues such as
land use, oceans and coastal concerns, water resources, conservation, and more
general environmental protection.56 A number of these NGOs are making
specific efforts on climate change. Just to note a few examples of the diverse
approaches these groups employ, Environment Oregon has an extensive
campaign focused on advocacy at multiple scales.57 The Ecumenical Ministries
of Oregon has climate change initiatives that range in scale from the
congregational level to the national level.5 8 The Northwest Earth Institute, which
aims to motivate individuals to change their foundational approaches, offers a
course specifically focused on climate change. 9
Moreover, some of these "nongovernmental" efforts involve innovative
public, private, and nonprofit partnerships. For example, a leading Portlandbased NGO on climate change, The Climate Trust, was established in 1997
when Oregon passed a law requiring new power plants built in the state to offset
their greenhouse gas emissions. 60 The Trust provides greenhouse gas offsets to
power plants, regulators, businesses, and individuals, and plays an active role in

s5
56

Grewe, Anderson, and Butman, 18 Govt Fin Rev at 9 (cited in note 7).
For examples of the types of environmental nongovernmental organizations operating in
Portland, search "Portland" at <www.idealist.org.> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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See
Environment
Oregon,
Global
Warming
Solutions,
available
online
at
<http://www.environmentoregon.org/global-warming> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, available online at <http://www.emoregon.org/
global-warming.php> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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See Northwest Earth Institute, available online at <http://www.nwei.org/> (visited Nov 17,
2007).
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The Climate Trust, About the Climate Trust, available online at <http://www.climatetrust.org/
about.us.php> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also The Climate Trust, The Climate Trust's Histoy,
available online at <http://www.cimatetrust.org/about-us-history.php> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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policy discussions. The Trust explains: "Our success is a result of our business
oriented approach. The Climate Trust's projects are expected to offset nearly 2.6
million metric tons of carbon dioxide from $8.8 million in investments-making
us one of the largest and most experienced offset buyers in the US and world
markets.'
In sum, Portland represents the closest that the United States has to a
success story on climate change. It demonstrates that urban areas have the
capacity to change their emissions profiles dramatically through comprehensive
planning efforts that rely upon partnerships between public, private, and
nonprofit entities. However, the Portland example also reveals the core tensions
presented by a green growth model. The cities participating in the Cities for
Climate Protection now represent approximately 15 percent of global
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.62 Whether or not they can bring
emissions down significantly while they grow represents a crucial question facing
climate change efforts based on prevailing economic models and goals.
B.

BALANCING OIL AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN TULSA

By 1920, Tulsa earned standing as the "oil capital" of the United States.
While other cities soon surpassed the Tulsa metropolitan area in size and oil
production, this legacy defines much of Tulsa's fabric and identity. Ostensibly,
this legacy stands in tension with local efforts to control carbon emissions.
Flames spilling from oil refineries on the west bank of the Arkansas River define
much of Tulsa's skyline. To drive large pick-up trucks or SUVs is to many
Tulsans a badge of local patriotism, a means to support the petroleum-based
local economy, which has been exposed to dramatic boom/bust cycles in the
past few decades with devastating economic impacts on the city. Until recently,
many Tulsans viewed recycling initiatives as inconvenient (and costly) nuisances.
And while numerous Ozone Alert days unpleasantly remind Tulsans of the
environmental costs of energy consumption, no entity in Oklahoma has ever
dedicated resources to measuring Tulsa's or the state's carbon footprint.63
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that former Tulsa Mayor and current
US Senator from Oklahoma, James Inhofe, lambasts the problem of global
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The Climate Trust, About the Climate Trust (cited in note 60).
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ICLEI: Local Governments
for
Sustainability, About CCP,
<http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=811 > (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Interview by Janet Koven Levit with Josh Davis, Policy and Research Analyst, City of Tulsa (Sept
25, 2007) (while the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality is tasked with such
measurements, the State has never budgeted for such measurements) ("Davis Interview").
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warming-and climate change advocacy-as "the greatest hoax ever perpetrated
on the American people; 6 4 he claims that this advocacy propagates a "big lie."65
In stark contrast to former Mayor Inhofe's stance, Tulsa's current mayor,
Kathy Taylor, became the 500th mayor to join the Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement, proclaiming that Tulsa is "[p]roud to be number 500!"66 In addition
to being the 500th mayor on a national scale, Mayor Taylor was the first mayor
of a major metropolitan area in Oklahoma to sign the Agreement.67 And, for the
first time in Tulsa's history, Mayor Taylor developed and published an Energy
Conservation and Efficiency Plan, a plan designed, in part, to reduce Tulsa's
carbon footprint.68 The City of Tulsa has thus led Tulsans and Oklahomans to
climate change consciousness in the oil and gas heartland.
Mayor Taylor's decision was not without naysayers. Taylor's counterpart in
Oklahoma City will not join the Agreement because he questions the solidity of
"science of global warming" and "doesn't want to break from the Bush
administration in signing an agreement similar to the Kyoto Protocol."69 A local
radio personality and columnist blasted Mayor Taylor for signing an agreement
that is "based on the scientifically dubious notion that global warming is caused
by human activity" and that requires "draconian restrictions on the economy...
that would cost jobs;" he suggests that the Mayor's "unilateral" decision is
incredibly out of sync with a community that keeps "sending the likes of Jim
Inhofe to represent us in Washington."7 Conspicuously, the oil and gas industry
did not join the chorus of naysayers.
How did Tulsa, the quintessential oil and gas city, arrive at this threshold?
A rather eclectic web of social activists, politicians, and private businesses
converged to bring Tulsa to this paradoxical juncture. The remainder of this
section identifies the socio-economic, political, and cultural forces that linked
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Jim Myers, Heat Wave Has Senator Sticking to Beliefs, Tulsa World Al (July 22, 2006).
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Office of the Mayor, Seattle, Washington, US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement: Quotes from
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ParticipatingMayors & Environmental Leaders, available online at <http://www.scattle.gov/mayor/
climate/quotes.htm#quotes> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Mayor Harold Haralson of Norman, Oklahoma, home to the University of Oklahoma, and a
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college town of a population significantly less than 100,000 (except on days that the Sooners have
a home football game) joined the Agreement in August 2005. See David Sutter, InAn Effort to Cut
Emissions... Tulsa Joins 'Green' Team, Oklahoman 11 A (May 15, 2007).
See City of Tulsa, Conservation and Effidengy Plan, (Apr 2007), available online at
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<http://www.cityoftulsa.org/OurCity/Mayor/documents/CityofTulsaEnergyConservationand
EfficiencyPlan.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Sutter, In an Effort to Cut Emissions,Oklahoman at 11A (cited in note 67).
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Michael D. Bates, Op-Ed, Her Honor, The Boss, Urban Tulsa (May 23, 2007), available online at
<http://www.urbantulsa.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3Al 7257> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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these actors in furtherance of emission reductions: (1) a burgeoning network of
local environmentally "conscious" nonprofits and collectives; (2) a new
administration in City Hall; (3) municipal budgetary shortfalls aggravated by the
sharp increase in oil prices; and (4) an alliance between environmentalists and a
local natural gas company in trying to block construction and operation of a
new, coal-fired electricity plant.
1. The Nonprofit Sector
Over the past decade, an environmentally conscious nonprofit sector
developed in Tulsa. While the local nonprofits are fledgling when compared with
national organizations, each year they grow exponentially, becoming increasingly
visible and vocal in local politics.7 1 In addition, local nonprofits with an
economic development, rather than an environmental, focus increasingly identify
"sustainability" as a feature that will enhance the marketability of,72 and
concomitant investment in, Tulsa. One of these groups has also forged
significant linkages with the transnational "cradle to cradle" (recycling)
movement.73
While many in these groups would self-identify as social activists, many
others are members of the business community, most notably the energy sector.
For instance, Seneca Scott, a Tulsan and Operations Manager of Trivestco
Energy, who is also President of the Oklahoma Sustainability Network
("OSN"), notes "[p]eople kid me about being employed in the oil and gas
industry and being involved in sustainability. But a lot of the producers are
concerned about having a clean environment., 74 Scott and others who have
grown the environmental nonprofit sector advocate a type of rational, marketbased environmentalism that balances "smart economic growth, a cleaner
environment, and socially just developments., 7' These nonprofit organizations
sat at the table as the Mayor decided to join the Agreement, assisting in
71

72

See, for example, Sustainable Tulsa, available online at <www.sustainabletulsa.org> (visited Nov
17, 2007); Oklahoma Sustainability Network, available online at <www.oksustainability.org>
(visited Nov 17, 2007);
Cherry Street Farmer's Market,
available
online
at
<www.cherrystreetfarmersmarkei.com> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See, for example, The Channels: A Bold Vision for the Tulsa Region, The Channels Overview,
available online at <http://www.tulsachannels.com/general.asp?id=2> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
(describing the nonprofit group, Tulsa Stakeholders, Inc, whose mission is to create a sustainable
tax base in Tulsa, as well as retain and attract talent and jobs to Tulsa).
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See William McDonough and Michael Braungart, Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make
Things (North Point 2002).
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(Apr 12, 2007).
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gathering data, formulating implementation strategies, and marketing the
Mayor's decision in a way that would be palatable to the broader public.
2. The Public Sector: The City of Tulsa
Tulsa would not have joined the Agreement when it did had it not been for
an administration change. Mayor Kathy Taylor beat incumbent Bill LaFortune in
April 2006, ushering in a period of significant change in City Hall. While some
of this change is attributable to political winds-Taylor is a Democrat and
LaFortune a Republican-most is attributable to Mayor Taylor's cosmopolitan,
businesslike approach to government. Taylor ran for office after a long,
successful career as a multinational lawyer, businesswoman, and Oklahoma's
Secretary for Commerce and Tourism. 6 Taylor campaigned on a promise to run
the City like a business and brings her extensive business experience to bear on
municipal government. Specifically, Taylor articulated the value of perceptionsthat the well-being of the City is linked, in part, to the way in which the City
markets itself-the City reflects not only what "is" but also what residents,
visitors, and businesses "think it is. ' ' 77 Additionally, in business, Taylor
recognized the importance of networks and business contacts; in government,
Taylor leveraged some of her business relationships on Wall Street and beyond
to network with Mayors Michael Bloomberg and Richard M. Daley very early on
in her term. 8
Mayor Taylor's decision to join the Agreement was, in part, the
convergence of her networking skills and her sharp knack for marketing and
timing. Mayor Bloomberg, praised by fellow mayors and environmentalists for
committing to transform New York City into the "green apple," 9 allegedly
orchestrated within the US Conference of Mayors the concept of Tulsa, and his
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See Taylor for Tulsa, Mayor Kathy Taylor, available online at <http://www.taylorfortulsa.com/
mayortaylor> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Taylor for Tulsa, Taylor for Tulsa-Prioilies-Economic Development, available online at
<http://www.taylorfortulsa.com/priorities/economicdevelopment> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See Mayor Bloombeq and Chicago Mayor Daly Kick-Off First Mayors Against Illegal Guns Coalition
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Regional Staff Conference, NYC.gov Press Release (Oct 25, 2006), available online at
<http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2fl c701 c789a0/
index.jsp?pagelD=mayorpress_release&catlD= 1194&docname=http%3A%2F%2F
www.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2006b%2Fpr375-06.htrnl&cc=unusedl 978&rc =
1194&ndi= 1> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Sewell Chan, Seeking a National Voice, 15 Mayors Meet on Gun
Violence, NY Times B1 (Apr 26, 2006).
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The US Conference of Mayors, Press Release, U.S. Conference of Mayors President Trenton Mayor
Palmer Commends Mayor Bloombergfor Leadersb on Climate Protection (May 15, 2007), available online
at <http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/pressreleases/documents/500mayors-051507.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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friend Kathy Taylor, joining as the 500th city.80 Seattle's Mayor Greg Nickels, the
founder of the initiative, embraced the idea, seeing Tulsa's participation in the
Agreement as emblematic of a growing demand for climate protection not
merely on the coasts but also in the heartland. 8 Taylor understood that this
would be an unprecedented global marketing splash for Tulsa and for her
stewardship of it. Bloomberg announced Tulsa as the 500th City to join at the
C40 Climate Summit, a transnational gathering of delegations from large cities,
organized in part by the Clinton Foundation.82 Tulsa received banner coverage
from the US Conference of Mayors.83 Tulsa also enjoyed positive press in the
national print media and blogosphere.84
Additionally, Taylor understood that committing to municipal emissions
reductions, under the auspices of the Agreement or any other initiative, was a
sound, bottom-line business decision.85 While $90/barrel for crude oil is
beneficial to Oklahoma's traditional oil companies, such prices pose a significant
burden to consumers. The City of Tulsa, with a substantial fleet of police, fire,
public transportation, and construction vehicles, is a major consumer of
traditional, emissions-producing fuels. Indeed, from fiscal year 2002 through
2006, while consumption remained level, municipal spending on "motor fuel"
increased over 250 percent due to the surge in fuel costs. 8 6 During the same
period, municipal coffers (and budgets) remained rather stagnant,8" on account
of the inextricable link between City revenue and sales tax, which is relatively
inelastic vis-A-vis a few booming oil companies.
80
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primary stream of revenue, as well as a shrinking sales tax base due to demographic shifts to the
"suburbs"). See also City of Tulsa, 2006-2007Annual Budget and CapitalPlan: Introduction,available
online at <http://www.cityoftulsa.org/OurCity/budget/budgetO6-07/SecOl-Introduction.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).

Winter 2008

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Thus, just as the City began searching for cost-saving mechanisms, the
Agreement's "best practices," admittedly tailored to reduce emissions, offered a
welcome roadmap for reducing costly fuel consumption and shifting to cheaper
(and cleaner) forms of energy, most notably natural gas. The Mayor ordered
department-by-department fuel consumption reductions, with an attendant
threat of budgetary sanctions if departments did not meet targets;" instituted a
"zero idling" policy for all City vehicles, with violations on "Ozone Alert Days"
resulting in disciplinary action or even termination;89 and proposed a new policy
on "take home vehicles," '0limiting police officers and other city employees
from driving city-owned vehicles to and from home.9" The City is also
negotiating biodiesel contracts, and it has started purchasing fleet vehicles that
run on compressed natural gas, a relatively cheap, clean, and abundant local
resource.92 The Mayor just received the City Council's approval to streamline
municipal government by consolidating all City offices within one, energy
efficient building.93
3. The Private Sector: The Natural Gas Industry
While Tulsa was once the oil and gas capital, today it is truly the natural gas
industry that drives the local economy. A recent showdown between the local
natural gas industry (led by Oklahoma City-based Chesapeake Corp., the largest
privately owned natural gas producer in the country) and the electricity utilities
operating in Oklahoma (Ohio-based AEP-PSO and Oklahoma-based OG&E),
over the proposed building of the Red Rock coal-fired power plant illustrates
this shift.94 In waging this battle, Chesapeake cloaked its position in "green"wear. In May 2007, as the Red Rock controversy boiled, Chesapeake introduced
a new "clean and green" logo, evoking the earth and creating a graphic link
between natural gas and "sound environmental choices" and a metaphysical link
with environmental activists.95 In addition, Chesapeake created and funded two
organizations, the American Clean Skies Foundation and KnowYourPower.net
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to market natural gas as a climate-protective, "clean burning" fuel.96
Furthermore, Chesapeake dedicated significant resources to lobbying local
(state) politicians, who themselves began equating coal with pollution, noting
that global warming is an "undeniable fact," and publicizing an Oklahoma
Climatological Survey that warned of local climate changes.97 Finally, Chesapeake
leveraged Red Rock's proximity to Tulsa to engage the City and the Mayor in a
subtle campaign in opposition to Red Rock and in favor of natural gas. 98 In the
end, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission rejected the Red Rock proposal. 99
While Chesapeake's position was admittedly self-serving-and the marriage
between the natural gas industry and environmental activists may be little more
than one of convenience-the discourse of the debate played a role in shifting
local environmental consciousness. The natural gas industry-the lifeblood of
Oklahoma's economy-became the "savior" of global warming. While
Oklahoma's senior Senator continues to argue that climate change is a "hoax,"
one aid to Mayor Taylor commented that he would be "hard pressed to find
energy-related companies in Oklahoma who deny that climate change is a
reality."' 00

III. BOTTOM-UP NETWORKS?
Tulsa's initiatives, admittedly years behind Portland on the climate
protection trajectory, are embryonic, and it is still too early to assess whether
Tulsa will convert its climate change talk into a meaningful walk. Yet, while the
climate-related narratives in Tulsa and Portland diverge at many points, they
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nonetheless reveal underlying commonalities that illuminate the critical role that
cities play in transnational climate change regulation.
This Section recounts the Portland and Tulsa stories through two
theoretical lenses that are gaining traction within the international legal academy:
(1) bottom-up international lawmaking-in managing day-to-day decisions, an
organic community of on-the-ground actors, including cities, triggers an
international lawmaking process; and (2) law and geography-these two "places"
represent complex socio-legal "spaces" that operate across multiscalar
networks. °1 While each account offers a richer narrative than traditional
approaches to international law and lawmaking, this Article locates the richest
narrative in the intersection of the two paradigms-an approach that we
introduce here as "bottom-up networking" and plan to explore in greater depth
in future scholarship.
A. A BOTTOM-UP STORY OF CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The Portland and Tulsa stories highlight the limitations of classic,
international lawmaking narratives. More often than not, international legal
scholars contemplate and analyze transnational issues like climate change from
the "top-down," fixating on the world of jet-setting diplomats or Rose Garden
signing ceremonies. In the traditional top-down approach to law and lawmaking,
State elites enact rules (typically formal, treaty-based rules) that govern the
practices and behaviors of those subject to the rules; in this account, lawmaking
ensues well beyond the physical and metaphysical reach of law's subjects.
Yet assessing climate change initiatives through the lens of the Kyoto
Protocol or other "top-down" international agreements0 2 offers a woefully
incomplete, impoverished portrait of climate change activity.'0 3 Private actors
and nonprofits, as well as some public actors (principally from state and local
government) coalesce not merely to implement edicts "from above," but also to

101 The meaning of and relationship between place and space are explored in depth in geography
literature. Although Osofsky has argued elsewhere that the nuances of these terms provide the
opportunity for legal insights, the focus of this Article is more on multiscalar networks. Given
that, this Article simply references that analysis and defines place as both a physical location and a
conceptual construct and space as the material and conceptual grid on which places are located.
For more in-depth analysis of these concepts, see, for example, Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of
Justice Wormholes: Dilemmasfrom Prperly and CriminalLaw, 53 Vill L Rev - (forthcoming 2008);

102
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Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II. Nanraives of Massachusetts v.
EPA, 8 Chi J Intl L 573 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven
School, 32 Yale J Intl L 421 (2007).
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), 37
ILM 22 (1998).
See Levit, 32 Yale J Intl L at 402-05 (cited in note 11).
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fill lacunae in national and international regulation, or, alternatively, to
counteract "top-down" decisions that are not palatable or practical for those on
the ground, operating in the trenches. Thus, through a process of "bottom-up
lawmaking," much international law surfaces. 0 4
Bottom-up lawmaking is a participatory, organic process, where a diverse
community of transnational actors-private parties, NGOs, and/or public
(state, local, and national) officials-coalesce around shared, on-the-ground
experiences and perceived self-interests. These actors' "micro-decisions," their
day-in and day-out choices, are designed to navigate a myriad of on-the-ground
exigencies and demands. Collectively, these "micro-decisions" assume normative
significance, as decisions become norms and as norms at once reflect and
condition future decisionmaking and practice. Over time, this patchwork of onthe-ground decisionmaking hardens as law, often embedding in a formal legal
instrument (treaty, statute, contract, administrative regulation). Thus, whereas
top-down international lawmaking is a process of laws internalized into day-today practice, bottom-up lawmaking is a process whereby practices and behaviors
are externalized as law.
What are the essential elements of a bottom-up approach to lawmaking?
The first focuses the lawmakers' identity and links their identity to a particular
space-the "bottom." State elites, diplomats, and national politicians recede to
the fringes, and, in their place, the grounded decisionmaker, or "practitioner,"
emerges as a powerful driver of international law and lawmaking. A bottom-up
approach to lawmaking conceives of the "practitioner" in broad terms, including
both public and private actors, some motivated by altruism and others motivated
by profit, who join with others similarly situated in avocation (although often
quite distant in location) to share experiences and standardize practices toward
shared goals and in furtherance of perceived mutual self-interest. Practitioners,
armed with intimate knowledge of niche trade and/or interest areas, grapple
foremost with the nitty gritty technicalities of their day-to-day existence rather
than the winds of geopolitics and diplomacy. Thus, whereas top-down
lawmaking often traverses significant space between regulator and regulated, the
bottom-up lawmaking process begins with minimal distance, often coincidence.
The second element of "bottom-up lawmaking" focuses on the normative
trajectory-these are lawmaking processes, and the activities of practitioners are
legally consequential. While isolated "practitioner" decisions are not initially
international "law," according to a rather formal, narrow taxonomy,0 5 these
104
105

See generally Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to InternationalLawmaking: The Tale of Three
Trade FinanceInstruments, 30 YaleJ Intl L 125 (2005).
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decisions ultimately become law, either by embedding directly in formal legal
instruments or by collectively placing pressure on and shaping legal outcomes.
The Tulsa and Portland climate protection stories are in one regard
bottom-up lawmaking tales, although in various states of scripting and
development. In terms of "official" hierarchies, both Tulsa and Portland are on
the "bottom" rung, subservient to Oklahoma and Oregon law, US law, and
international law. In addition to this formal nesting, localities are functional
climate change "practitioners" in that they close physical and metaphysical
distance between climate change practices and decisionmaking. First, cities are
corporate entities that consume energy and thus emit greenhouse gases. Second,
cities physically "host" residents' and businesses' energy consumption and
emissions. Third, day-to-day municipal decisions-from mass transit budgetary
allocations to recycling programs, from street layout and sidewalks to economic
development and sales tax incentives-echo, at times faintly and at times quite
loudly, as climate change decisions.
Such micro-decisions, in conjunction with each other, bear hard legal
consequences that have an impact on global emissions, especially in light of the
substantial aggregate contribution of cities. Portland's climate-related
decisionmaking was not so micro and atomistic-the Portland City Council,
through binding city resolution, coupled policy change with hard emission
reduction targets."0 6 Similarly, while the Mayors Agreement is not "binding,"
Mayor Taylor's signature and subsequent micro-decisions, perhaps motivated as
much, if not more, by budgetary considerations than the Agreement itself, carry
real legal sanctions-budgetary cuts, personnel decisions, long-term natural gas
purchase contracts, and incentives-and collectively will shape climate-related
regulation at multiple regulatory scales."0 "
Yet micro-decisions within municipalities also shift perceived interests,
motivations, and strategies of other transnational actors, namely those in the
private sector, who in turn use the cover of municipal decisions to alter the
course of hard law. For instance, in Tulsa, Mayor Taylor's environmental
initiatives-her joining the Agreement and issuing Tulsa's Conservation Planprovided Chesapeake with additional ammunition to push for changes in natural
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gas regulation at the state and federal levels.'0 8 Similarly, the commitments of
Portland and Oregon to "green" business create an environment in which
companies feel encouraged to try to get ahead of the regulatory curve on climate
change.'0 9
Finally, as the following sections will discuss at greater length, municipal
decisionmaking creates a focal point for various actors to coalesce and thus to
forge linkages and coalitions, which ultimately may chart the course of law. For
instance, Portland's municipal decision to create the Energy Trust of Oregon
effectively linked the private and nonprofit sectors in a very potent, normreinforcing manner."0 In Tulsa, prior to signing the Agreement or rolling out the
Conservation Plan, Mayor Taylor convened a meeting of twenty-four
representatives from the City, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, county
governments, local and statewide nonprofits, and the natural gas industry."'
From an account of the meeting," 2 the purpose was not approval, but buy-in,
and the byproduct was a burgeoning coalition that not only supported
Chesapeake's legal battle against coal-fired energy but also helped to introduce
environmental consciousness into mainstream, day-to-day discourse.
B. A LAW AND GEOGRAPHY STORY OF CITIES AND
CLIMATE CHANGE
This bottom-up narrative opens up the need for a second story of Portland
and Tulsa, one which focuses on public, private, and nonprofit dynamics taking
place in multiscalar networks. The difficulty with the traditional international law
account of cities-as virtually irrelevant except through their limited interaction
with formal nation-state lawmaking-is not simply that it ignores the richness of
the bottom. Rather, it misses the multiscalar dimensions of the international
lawmaking process. Cities are interacting with international standards and across
international borders, but also localizing them simultaneously. In other words,
cities' engagement with the issue of climate change is a continuous process of
simultaneous scaling up and scaling down. They engage local dimensions of the
climate change problem, but do so in formal and informal communication with
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of governance and with the multiscalar nature
policy dialogues at multiple levels
73
impacts.
their
and
emissions
of
Geographer Kevin Cox's insights into networks and scale provide a
framing lens for this second story. Cox postulates the politics of space as
involving a dynamic interaction between what he terms "spaces of dependence"
and "spaces of engagement."'1 4 He explains that "[s]paces of dependence are
defined by those more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend
for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes
elsewhere; they define place-specific conditions for our material well being and
sense of significance.""' In contrast, spaces of engagement are "the space in
which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds.""' 6 Cox explains
that these two types of spaces interact because "[p]eople, firms, state agencies,
etc., organize in order to secure the conditions for the continued existence of
their spaces of dependence but in so doing they have to engage with other
centers of social power: local government, the national press, perhaps the
international press, for example.""'
Cox then argues that in order to understand the dynamics between these
two types of spaces, we should treat the spatiality of scale as one of networks
rather than arenas." 8 Or, in plainer language, instead of treating political contests
as taking place within an enclosed level of governance, we should treat them as
occurring across complex formal and informal networks. Although decisions
formally occur in the place-specific contexts of Portland and Tulsa, they can
only be understood through recognizing both places as enmeshed in complex
networks of relationships.
Cox's geographic approach to networks and scale allows for a richer
account of these two cities' efforts to address climate change. On the one hand,
both Portland and Tulsa must grapple with spaces of dependence, which are
created through the core local relationships that constitute the places that they
are and that they strive to be. In each of the above examples the "where"
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matters deeply. 119 Portland's location in Oregon and its coastal identity, as well
as the particular arrays of actors at different points in time, make its leadership
on urban emissions reduction possible.120 Tulsa's physical connections to both
oil and gas, as well as the conflicting pressures its public and business leaders
face, form the foundations of its more fledgling efforts. 121 These
"spaces of
122
dependence" form the core of the bottom-up lawmaking story.
And yet even those very local policies and relationships have multiscalar
dimensions. As we unpack what drives the choices each city makes, they clearly
influence and are influenced by networks that cross borders and levels of
governance. Portland began down its path because of city-specific and statespecific decisions, but also because its leaders were talking to decisionmakers in
other cities around the world. 1 23 Tulsa's choice to join that network formally
thirteen years later reflects enmeshed local, state, national, and international
dynamics. Shifts in its energy industry, political dynamics, and public perceptions
of climate change created a space in which Tulsa could become the 500th US
city. Each city's spaces of dependence are shaped by and help to shape its
spaces of engagement because of their enmeshment in multiscalar relationships.
C. THE VALUE OF BOTTOM-UP NETWORKING
The combining of these two stories brings us to a more complete narrative,
that of "bottom-up networking." This final account views the networks being
created by and shaping the decisions of Portland and Tulsa as constituted
through simultaneous scaling up and scaling down processes. It recognizes the
multiple components of international lawmaking, but particularly emphasizes the
on-the-ground, smaller-scale details as a critical part of a larger-scale
conversation and vice versa.
A bottom-up networking narrative enriches the previous accounts in three
main ways. First, it assists with defining the "bottom" as a socially-constituted
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and ever-shifting terrain. Consider, for example, the question of where we
should locate the mayors of Portland and Tulsa in our international lawmaking
hierarchy. A formal account might put them at the bottom, as they have no
power to create nation-state consent. But as mayors around the world
increasingly communicate 12 ' and their personal identities become more
international,126 have they become part of the elite decisionmakers? How do we
tell that story differently, if at all, based on which city they represent and that
city's geography? An unpacking of the spaces of dependence and engagement in
the local allows for a constituting and reconstituting of the bottom-up story.
Second, a focus on the bottom helps to ensure that the network story is
told in a more complete fashion. The predominant international lawmaking story
grounded in the consent of sovereign and equal nation-states 121--even iffew
international law scholars or practitioners subscribe to that narrative fullyshapes who and what belong at the center of our lens. To understand fully the
spaces of dependence and engagement in these two case examples, we need to
sift through the details and to grasp their scalar complexity. Bottom-up
networking avoids the simple characterization of the mayors involved as purely
local because it allows for the richness of their socio-legal identity.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the combining of these narratives
allows for better policy on climate change because it locates municipal efforts
more accurately. Greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts are infused with
inequality and the specific dynamics of place.128 To get at this problem, we not
only need efforts at every scale, but we also have to be able to put them
together. By focusing on the "bottom" and its embeddedness in networks
simultaneously, a clearer picture of these cities as climate regulators emerges.

125 Portland's initial efforts on climate change resulted from just such a dialogue. See Foyston,
Warming World, Oregonian El (cited in note 25).
126 Mayor Kathy Taylor, with her international business experience, is an example of such a mayor.
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See notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
See Ian Brownlie, Prinaples of Public InternationalLaw 287-88 (Oxford 6th ed 2003); Michael J.
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LegalTheoy orReturn to Rule by the Great Powers?,10 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff361 (2005).
128 See Osofsky, 8 ChiJ Intl L at 585, 617 (cited in note 101); Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate
Change: A Climate Justice Proposalfor a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 Buffalo L Rev
(forthcoming Spring 2008) (draft manuscript on file with Hai M. Osofsky); Hari M. Osofsky,
Contextualing Climate Injustice (draft manuscript on file with Hari M. Osofsky); Maxine Burkett, A
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IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: CITIES AS
MULTISCALAR ACTORS

Gerald Frug and David Barron conclude their article, InternationalLocal
Government Law, by noting that, "There is a role for the international local
government law in shaping the future of urban life. But that role cannot be
defined piecemeal or without an appreciation of its impact on the local
government law that now affects every city in the world.' ' 129 We contend that

bottom-up networking, through its holistic lens, has the potential to provide
further illumination of that role.
This Article ultimately aims to open up a set of research questions. By
beginning to unravel the significance of efforts by Portland and Tulsa on climate
change, it asks how the "where" matters in greenhouse regulation. 30 In the
process, the Article begins to explore how bottom-up and geographic analysis
might enhance accounts of cities in a globalizing world.
We plan in future work on bottom-up networking to continue to develop
these ideas further both conceptually and descriptively. As a conceptual matter,
that effort will situate bottom-up networking more fully amid international legal
theory, urban theory, and critical geography, with a particular emphasis on the
ways in which legal pluralism might help to tie these streams together.'
Descriptively, we intend to move beyond the specific context of cities and
climate change to engage the broader policy implications of bottom-up
networking.
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The critical, multiscalar problems facing the world today make such
analyses particularly important. As our formally-scaled legal systems grapple with
the overwhelming complexity of issues like climate regulation, the details may
lend much-needed policymaking flexibility. If each level of governance is actually
multiscalar and the overlapping hierarchies are constructed through a blend of
formal and informal relationships, perhaps international lawmaking can move
beyond law's rigidity.
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